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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper’s purpose is to examine the importance of controlling for the comparability of the units in 
a sample when examining wage differentials of various types. We use U.S. CPS data for the period 
1992-2000 to compare estimated wage differentials between public and private sector workers 
obtained using two different methodologies: Lee’s two-step method that controls for the selection 
bias resulting from the non-randomness of the sample, and the propensity score matching method 
that controls also for the comparability of the workers. Lee’s method suggests that federal workers 
are paid a premium, while state and local workers are underpaid compared to private sector 
workers. However the matching method indicates that this data is too heterogeneous to be used to 
compare wages across sectors. We conclude that, when the outcome under study is not only affected 
by some sort of selection but also requires comparable groups, the traditional methodology may not 
be enough.  
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ince the 1970s, many studies have attempted to compare wages between the public and private sector in 
the United States, under the premise that similar workers should be paid similar wages, regardless the 
sector of employment.  The majority of these studies are based on simple human capital models, expanded 
to account for some productivity related characteristics of the workers, although more recent papers have paid more 
attention to the selection bias problem. The general literature usually concludes that there exist a positive wage 
premium, or rent, paid to public sector workers, that increases with the level of government. Such a rent has been 
attributed to either the differences in the structure of the wage-setting system between the two sectors, or as the result 
of methodological problems.  
 
That the wage-setting systems differ in both sectors is obvious. The public sector is not a profit maximizing 
agent, and therefore its wages are not determined by the forces driving the labor market as happens in the private 
sector. Besides, the public sector is subject to political influences, which could lead the government to pay wages 
higher than those paid to similar workers in the private sector.  It is because this lack of information provided by the 
market that the public sector applies the prevailing wage principle that states that similar workers, performing similar 
jobs, should be paid similar wages, regardless the sector of employment. However, since not all jobs in the public 
sector have a similar counterpart in the private sector, the comparison should examine comparable workers. But the 
use of the wrong methodology to approach the problem may provide misleading results. It is known that since workers 
differ in their skills and taste for job attributes, they will self-allocate into the job that maximizes their utility. The 
resulting nonrandom allocation of workers among sectors may generate selection bias problems. In cases like this, 
ruling out possible sources of endogeneity that may affect the outcome is not always enough. When the analysis is 
based on comparing units that are assumed to be similar, one should also examine the comparability of the so 
considered “comparable groups.” Comparability implies that workers have similar human capital, as well as other 
productivity-related characteristics so that they have the same likelihood of being employed in a specific sector. Using 
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplement for the period 1992-2000, we compare the results 
of models where only the endogeneity of the sector of employment is accounted for with those obtained when the 
S 
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comparability of the groups also is considered, based on propensity score matching methods.  The results indicate that 
ignoring the level of heterogeneity among the units in the sample under study may yield misleading results. 
Unfortunately, in spite of its wide use to compare wages across sectors, the CPS data set seems to lack substantial 
numbers of workers from both groups that are truly comparable.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The first attempts to estimate wage differentials between the public and the private sector can be traced back 
to the 1970s with a series of studies conducted by Sharon Smith (1974a, 1974b, 1977, 1981), based on OLS estimates 
of human capital models. Her work was then followed by similar papers based on transformations of her models, to 
account for some variables considered as relevant, or disaggregating the data by occupation or by region. These 
studies were based on the idea that workers with similar productivity-related characteristics should be paid similar 
wages regardless of the sector of employment. However none of them actually controlled for how comparable were 
the workers in the sample. The general conclusion was that public sector workers, especially women, are 
overcompensated and that the wage premium increases with the level of government.  
 
During the 1990‟s, the main concern of the studies at this regard shifted toward finding the best 
methodological approach to the public/private wage comparison, emphasizing the reduction of any potential source of 
bias. Of particular importance was the selectivity bias resulting from the nonrandomness of the sample. Most of the 
studies correcting for selection bias in comparing wages across sectors were based on two-step models that control for 
the effect of one or more of the following decisions on wages: union status, labor force participation and sector of 
employment [Gyourko and Tracy, (1988); Belman and Heywood, (1989); Venti, (1989); Hundley, (1991); 
Choudhury, (1994); Hoffnar and Greene, (1996)]. In general, these studies support the idea of a premium paid to 
public sector workers, but show inconclusive results regarding the effect of selection bias on the wage premium.  
 
The two-step-type methodology these studies apply may correct for the potential bias resulting from the 
nonrandomness of the sample, so that the estimated parameters would not be affected by the probability of being in 
the sample. But this methodology does not ensure that the workers are similar, as the comparison requires. A more 
recent approach to dealing with selection bias in nonrandomized observational studies is based on so-called matching 
methods. These methods allow the investigator to limit the comparison to paired individuals on the basis of a set of 
observables or pre-treatment characteristics, reducing the bias and generating matched control groups that can be used 
as “virtual” counterfactuals. The most common matching approach bases the comparison on the propensity score or 
conditional probability that the individual is in the treated group, which reduces the k-dimensional comparison to one 
single variable [Rubin (1973); Rosenbaum and Rubin, (1983)]. In the labor economics field, matching methods have 
basically been used to measure the impact of job-training programs on wages [LaLonde (1986); Ichimura (1993); 
Heckman et. al. (1997); Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002); Kordas and Lehrer (2002); Abadie and Imbens (2002)], 
while their potential use to compare wages across sectors has not been yet exploited. Ramoni (2004) estimated the 
propensity score as given by the probability of choosing to work in a specific sector, and used this score to select 
homogeneous matched subsamples on which to base compensation comparisons among sectors in the United States.  
 
DATA 
 
This study uses the information provided by the Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplement, which 
includes individual-level information on labor force status and other demographic variables for individuals working in 
the federal, state, and local governments as well as in private industry. 
 
We considered five waves for the period 1992-2000
1
 pooled into a single data set in order to gain efficiency. 
The final sample includes individuals 16 years of age and older, and excludes those individuals working in the 
agricultural sector, those self-employed or in the armed forces as well as those working less than 10 or more than 80 
hours a week or who earned less than half of the minimum hourly wage in effect at the time of the interview. The final 
data set includes 52,792 individuals, 86.54% of them working in the private sector and the remaining 13.46% 
employed in the public sector. Among those in the public sector, 22.62% work at the federal level, 25.39% work at the 
state level, and 51.99% work for local governments. This disaggregation of the information by level of government 
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constitutes the one of the most important feature of this data set, as well as the relatively larger sample size. This may 
explain why many studies comparing wages are based on the CPS. Unfortunately, the specific data set used in this 
study shows a very high level of heterogeneity among workers across sectors, suggesting that it may not be suitable 
for comparisons purposes.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
When the availability of the data or the sampling method is influenced by a selection process that is related to 
the value of the dependent variable under study, a sample selection problem may arise, introducing correlation 
between the error term and the regressors, thus biasing the estimates.   
 
In the case of wage comparisons across sectors, a potential source of bias may come from the fact that 
individuals self-allocate into the sector that matches their preferences. Consider the following wage model  
 
Ws = Xs s + s                     (1a) 
Ws* = Ms s + s                     (1b) 
 
where Xs and Ms are vectors of observed productivity and demographic characteristics, s is a categorical decision 
variable that represents the sector of employment, and s is an error term with mean zero and variance 
2
s. The wage 
Ws is observed if and only if the sector s is chosen, which happens when Ws* > maxjs (Wj*). Estimating s and s 
ignoring that s and s are not independent, may yield inconsistent results.  
 
Heckman (1974) developed a way to address the sample selection problem based on a two-step procedure. 
This methods is implemented by first estimating s in equation (1b) based on a logit or probit model, in order to 
compute the Mills ratio as given by the ratio between the standard normal density function [(M)] and the normal 
distribution function [M)]. This ratio is then used in the right hand side of equation (1a) to obtain consistent 
estimates of s. Lee (1983) generalized Heckman‟s method to the case where the selection is based on a multinomial 
logit model. In general, these methods are seen as yielding consistent but not asymptotically efficient estimates under 
the normality assumption. The main drawback of these methods is that the reliability of the results is often limited to 
the satisfaction of a complex set of assumptions that include functional form restrictions and exclusion restrictions 
regarding the variables to be included in the output equation necessary for identification purposes, making the method 
less robust statistically, and providing only a partial correction for the selection bias issue. 
 
To properly compare wages between the public and the private sector, one should compare the wage a 
worker is paid in the public sector and the wage he would be paid in the private sector. Of course it is impossible to 
observe both wages for anyone, making it necessary to find an adequate counterfactual to, say, public sector workers, 
i.e. private sector workers who are as similar as possible to those in the public sector. Matching methods are based on 
the idea that the selection bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is performed only between treated and 
control units who are similar. These methods therefore involve pairing treated and control units that are comparable in 
terms of their observable characteristics, which are assumed to be independent from the assignment to the treatment. 
But matching based on a k-dimensional vector of characteristics may not be feasible, especially for a large k. In the 
seminal paper by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the authors proposed the propensity score matching as a method to 
reduce the bias in the estimation of treatment effects. The main feature of the propensity score is that it reduces the 
dimensionality of the comparison from k variables to a single value. 
 
Let sector of employment D, be the decision variable. The treated group is given by individuals working in a 
particular sector, for instance the public sector (D=1), while the control group includes the private sector workers 
(D=0). The propensity score (PS) as defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin, is the conditional probability of being in the 
public sector, given pre-treatment characteristics X. i.e., PS = Pr {D=1 | X}  = E {D | X} 
 
If the selection of sector of employment is random according to X, it is also random according to PS. With 
randomization the treated and control groups do not substantially differ from each other, so that the results are no 
longer conditioned to the treatment.  
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For the PS method to represent the best possible approximation to a random allocation of individuals across 
sectors such that their wages can be compared, the assumption of strong ignorability of the treatment should be 
satisfied. This condition combines the two following assumptions: 
 
Balancing Of Pre-Treatment Variables 
 
Given the PS, also referred to as ignorability of treatment or unconfoundedness, which ensures that the PS 
provides all the necessary information regarding the determinants of the decision about sector of employment, so that 
the outcome (wages) is independent from D. This assumption requires observations with the same PS to have the same 
distribution of observable (and unobservable) variables regardless of the treatment status (sector). If this is true, for a 
given PS the assignment to treatment (sector) is random. Therefore treated and control units should on average be 
identical. 
 
Common Support 
 
The probability of assignment to treatment is bounded between one and zero, which implies that the 
matching should be performed over an area of common support. If there is no overlap in the PSs in both sectors, it is 
not possible to match individuals, and no outcome difference can be estimated with that data. Therefore this condition 
rules out the possibility of perfect prediction, since workers with PS equals to 1 or to 0 cannot be matched. This would 
mean that only workers with a similar probability of working in the public sector could be matched.  
 
The main drawbacks of this method lie on the estimation of the PS. As Rosenbaum and Rubin showed, under 
the strong ignorability assumption the PS eliminates the bias, making unnecessary any assumption about functional 
form, separability of outcome or exogeneity of the conditioning variables, so common in control function models. 
However, Heckman and Navarro (2004) showed that these matching methods break down when there are variable that 
perfectly predict the decision, which suggest that choosing the appropriate variables to model the decision may be 
difficult. In fact, the propensity score matching methods do not distinguish between the variables affecting the 
outcome (Z) and those affecting the decision (X), as happen in many econometric procedures, including control 
function models. This distinction could help to overcome the perfect prediction problem, if there are some variables X 
not in Z.  Moreover, the propensity score matching methods do not provide any rule as to which variables to include 
or exclude in the conditioning set. 
 
The PS is generally estimated by parametric procedures, usually logit or probit,
2
 on the basis of a set of 
conditioning variables that affect in our case the decision to work in the public sector following the general algorithm:  
 
 Estimate the propensity score by using a logit (or probit) model starting with a parsimonious specification 
with linear covariates. 
 Divide the observations into k equally spaced intervals of the PS, such that within each interval the difference 
in the PS for treated and control groups is insignificant.  
 Within each interval, test the hypothesis that the average of each covariate does not differ between treated 
and control groups.
3
  
 If the intervals are not balanced, re-estimate the PS by adding higher order variables and/or interactions. If 
there are no differences, the specification is accepted. 
 
To emphasize the importance of controlling for the comparability of the workers among sectors when 
calculating wage differentials, we apply both Lee‟s two-step method and propensity score matching method to the 
CPS data set for the period considered. The selection of sector of employment is modeled as given by: 
 
SECTOR= f(AGE, EDUCTG, GENDER, RACE, VETERN, MARTST, CENREG) +                 (3) 
 
where SECTOR is a selection variable that equals one for workers in the private sector, two for workers in the federal 
level, three for the state level and four for the local level of government. To apply the Lee‟s method, equation (3) is 
estimated using a multinomial logit model from which to calculate hazard functions. The propensity score matching 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – May 2006                                                               Volume 4, Number 5 
 47 
methods, on the other hand, are based on binary decisions, so that the estimates of the multinomial logit model cannot 
be used.
4
 To overcome this problem, we compare each level of government (treated group) with the private sector 
(control group), assuming that the probability of working in the public sector is different in each level of the 
government, and that these probabilities are independent from each other. In this case, SECTOR would be a dummy 
variable that equals one if the worker is employed in a specific level of government, and zero for private sector 
workers. 
 
It is expected that individuals working for the government at any level are relatively older (AGE) and have a 
higher level of education (EDUCTG). More discrimination is expected in the private sector, in which case we should 
see a higher proportion of men (GENDER) and whites (RACE) working in this sector. The public sector tends to give 
more employment opportunities to veterans (VETERN). Also, assuming that public sector workers enjoy more job 
stability as some studies suggest, married workers (MARTST) should be more likely to work for the government. 
Public and private job opportunities may not be evenly spread around the country, with a greater or lesser number of 
public jobs in different regions (REGION). Finally,  is a stochastic error term that follows a normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance 2.  
 
In the case of the two-step procedure, a vector of hazard functions mˆ  is used to correct a wage equation as 
given by:  
 
LOGW = 0 + 1AGE+ 2AGE
2
+ 3EDUCTG+ 5RACE+ 6GENDER+ 7MARTST+ 8HEALTH+ 9FULTME 
+ 10T+                       (4) 
 
where LOGW is the logarithm of hourly wages; AGE is a proxy for general experience, and is expected to have a 
positive impact on wages (1>0) at a declining rate (2<0). The returns to formal education should also be positive. 
Following the literature, wages are expected to be higher for men and whites. Married workers are seen as being more 
responsible at work, and therefore receiving higher wages. 
 
Health status (HEALTH) is considered here as a measure of a relevant condition affecting not just the 
worker‟s general performance, but also his tenure and therefore affecting wages. The same positive effect on wages 
can be expected for the full-time working condition (FULTME). Finally, T includes four dummy variables, each 
corresponding to a different year of the survey, assuming the year 1992 as the base, to account for potential cohort 
effect, while  is a vector of stochastic errors distributed N(0,
2
).
5
 
 
In the matching method, on the other hand, treated units are matched following the Nearest Neighbor (NN) 
matching method
6
 with replacement, so that each treated unit can be matched with several similar control units. After 
individuals are matched, the unmatched members of the control group are discarded.  The subsamples in this way 
obtained, are used to estimate wage equations as given by (4) by sector of employment.  
 
Rent is assumed to exit if the returns to the productivity-related characteristics are higher in the public sector. 
The wage comparison can be done considering indexes calculated by level of education as given by (Bellante and 
Long , 1983) based on the sum of the differences in the jth coefficient estimated in the wage equations by sector 
evaluated in terms of the average characteristics of the workers in the private sector (
jp
X ).
7
 If these factors receive the 
same remuneration in all sectors, such an index should tend to zero. Otherwise, if such an index still shows that a 
wage differential persists, this could indicate that the returns to these factors are not the same in all sectors, and 
expression (5) would measure the pure sectoral differences in the payoffs in human capital and other qualities between 
public and private sector workers, i.e. rent.  
 


k
1j
jppjgj
X ) -  ˆˆ(                        (5) 
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RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
The main statistics of the sample shown in Table 1 indicate that public sector workers are on average 
significantly older, especially at the federal level, compared to those in the private sector.  Also as expected, a 
relatively higher proportion of women working for the government is observed, particularly at the state and local 
levels.  In the same way, the participation of nonwhite workers in the private sector is relatively smaller, with a higher 
tendency for them to work at the federal and local levels. Veterans are more likely to work in the public sector, 
especially at the federal level. Married workers seem to be more likely to work for the government, especially at the 
federal and local levels, in line with the presumption that married workers will particularly value more stable jobs, and 
the public sector is perceived as offering greater job stability. Workers living in the South and West census regions are 
more likely to work in the federal sector. 
 
The sample clearly shows that public sector workers tend to have higher levels of education compared to 
private sector workers, with a higher proportion of workers with some college or more is observed in the public sector, 
especially at the federal and state levels. Also, average wages are substantially higher in the public sector at any level, 
but especially in the federal government. While the general literature suggests a relatively higher compression of 
wages in the public sector [Borjas (2002); Katz and Krueger (1991); Poterba and Rueben (1994)], a smaller dispersion 
of wages around the mean is only observed in the state level. Only federal workers seem to work more average hours 
per week, than those in the private sector. 
 
A relevant conclusion that can be obtained from Table 1 is that the CPS sample is a very heterogeneous data 
set, with substantial differences in mean or proportions among sectors for all relevant variables. In fact, based on the 
results of the test for differences in means or proportions (p-values are presented in Table 1) statistically significant 
differences among all sectors are observed in terms of all the variables except health status.
 
Similar results were 
obtained when each specific level of government was compared to the private sector.  
 
As will be shown in the next section, this high level of heterogeneity of the units suggests that the sample 
does not include comparable workers from each sector, which is a necessary condition if we want to test the premise 
of whether “similar” workers are paid similar wages. In addition, propensity score methods may be used to select 
homogenous subsamples, which may facilitate the comparison. However, these methods do not work with samples 
that do not already include a significant proportion of comparable workers, since the heterogeneity of the sample 
reduces the chances of finding good matches. 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – May 2006                                                               Volume 4, Number 5 
 49 
  Note: * denotes failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal means or proportions between sectors. 
 
 
As stated before, based on the Lee‟s selection bias correction model, we estimate equation (3) using a 
multinomial logit model to obtain consistent estimators of the conditional expected values of the residuals in the 
multinomial decision model (mj, for j=1,…,4, one for each sector of employment). These results are used to adjust 
wage equations as given by (4) by sector of employment, where the estimated coefficients corresponding to these mj 
variables represent the covariance between  and .   
 
As shown in Table 2, in all sectors wages increase with human capital investments, but the returns to these 
investments vary by sector. In fact, age has a positive effect on wages, at a declining rate. This marginal effect is 
substantially higher in the state level, and relatively smaller for workers in the local level.  The returns to education at 
all level are higher in the federal sector, compared to all other sectors. At the local level, only for high skill workers 
are these returns higher than those in the private sector, while the state level shows the lowest returns at almost all 
levels of education.  
 
Gender and race are positively related to wages, indicating that men and whites are paid more than women 
and nonwhites. However their impact is not higher in the private sector as anticipated.  Being married and in good 
health are also associated with higher wages, except at federal level. Also as expected, fulltime status positively affect 
wages. Finally, the coefficients that account for the cohort effect have all positive signs, indicating a constant increase 
of average wages over time, usually stronger in the private sector over the period studied.  
Table 1 
Productivity-Related Characteristics Of Workers 
Variables Definition Values Private Federal State Local P-Value 
CENREG Census region division (%):Northeast (1); 
Midwest (2); South (3); West (4) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
16.33 
26.48 
34.49 
22.71 
15.56 
21.41 
34.97 
28.06 
18.79 
28.44 
26.55 
26.22 
15.45 
25.95 
29.36 
29.23 
0.000 
EDUCTG Level of education (%): HS dropout (1); 
HS (2); some college (3); college and 
more (4) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
21.54 
39.79 
28.97 
9.70 
9.90 
35.65 
37.88 
16.57 
11.45 
29.67 
38.62 
20.27 
16.83 
34.72 
32.08 
16.37 
0.000 
FULTME Fulltime working condition (%): yes (1); 
no (0) 
0 
1 
24.71 
75.29 
9.02 
90.98 
26.83 
73.17 
29.96 
10.04 
0.000 
GENDER Gender (%): male (1); female (0) 0 
1 
52.36 
47.64 
48.10 
51.90 
61.31 
38.69 
61.68 
38.32 
0.000 
HEALTH Self-reported health status (%): excellent 
/ good (1); otherwise (0) 
0 
1 
6.39 
93.61 
5.71 
94.29 
5.83 
94.17 
5.66 
94.34 
0.588* 
MARTST Marital status (%): married (1); otherwise 
(0) 
0 
1 
44.81 
55.16 
35.03 
64.97 
44.12 
55.88 
32.21 
67.79 
0.000 
RACE Race (%): white (1); otherwise (0) 0 
1 
14.79 
85.21 
26.26 
73.74 
19.35 
80.65 
20.35 
79.65 
0.000 
UNION Union status (%): yes (1); no (0) 0 
1 
98.85 
1.15 
85.66 
14.34 
92.84 
7.16 
92.23 
7.77 
0.000 
VETERN Veteran status (%): yes (1); no (0) 0 
1 
90.87 
9.13 
70.69 
29.31 
88.58 
11.42 
90.04 
9.96 
0.000 
AGE Age (years) Mean 
s.d 
35.41 
12.10 
40.81 
10.34 
37.92 
12.19 
40.13 
11.12 
0.000 
HRSWEK Hours worked per week Mean 
s.d 
36.81 
10.14 
40.09 
8.17 
34.97 
10.74 
35.46 
10.84 
0.000 
PS Propensity score Mean 
s.d 
0.131 
0.054 
0.172 
0.060 
0.150 
0.059 
0.154 
0.055 
0.000 
WAGEHR Hourly wage Mean 
s.d 
9.68 
5.99 
13.80 
6.62 
10.75 
5.67 
11.06 
6.90 
0.000 
N Sample size  45,686 1,607 1,804 3,695  
Journal of Business & Economics Research – May 2006                                                               Volume 4, Number 5 
 50 
Table 2 
Two-Step Method: Estimated Wage Equations 
Variables Private Federal State Local 
Age 0.0466 
(22.46)1 
0.0445 
(3.71)1 
0.0556 
(5.00)1 
0.0239 
(2.66)1 
Age2 -0.0005 
(-23.90)1 
-0.0005 
(-3.85)1 
-0.0006 
(-5.20)1 
-0.0003 
(-3.30)1 
Eductg  
(High school) 
0.0614 
(9.53)1 
0.1465 
(3.74)1 
0.0120 
(0.32) 
0.0454 
(1.78)3 
Eductg  
(Some college) 
0.0447 
(4.12)1 
0.1759 
(3.22)1 
0.0752 
(1.30) 
0.0021 
(0.05) 
Eductg  
(College +) 
0.1350 
(8.12)1 
0.2903 
(3.96)1 
0.0407 
(0.52) 
0.1774 
(3.04)1 
Race 
(White) 
0.1018 
(12.66)1 
0.1198 
(3.32)1 
0.0541 
(1.50) 
0.0725 
(2.58)1 
Gender 
(Male) 
0.2305 
(39.65)1 
0.2147 
(7.12)1 
0.2095 
(7.23)1 
0.2548 
(11.27)1 
Health 
(Good health) 
0.0877 
(7.26)1 
-0.0229 
(-0.36) 
0.0440 
(0.74) 
0.1243 
(2.69)1 
Martst 
(Married) 
0.1253 
(19.76)1 
-0.0207 
(-0.62) 
0.1585 
(4.83)1 
0.0128 
(0.51) 
Fultme 0.1898 
(35.85)1 
0.2467 
(6.78)1 
0.2751 
(10.97)1 
0.1786 
(10.00)1 
T (1994)(a) 0.0494 
(8.73)1 
0.0059 
(0.22) 
0.0657 
(2.52)2 
0.0846 
(4.17)1 
T (1996) 0.1002 
(15.23)1 
0.0544 
(1.72)3 
0.1697 
(5.28)1 
0.1127 
(4.68)1 
T (1998) 0.1829 
(28.33)1 
0.0420 
(1.30) 
0.1626 
(5.26)1 
0.1934 
(8.17)1 
T (2000) 0.2657 
(41.00)1 
0.1364 
(4.12) 
0.1942 
(6.48)1 
0.2288 
(10.03)1 
m1  -0.6097 
(-1.72)3 
-0.3491 
(-1.00) 
0.4522 
(1.32) 
-0.5219 
(-2.24)2 
m2 -0.7515 
(-2.72)1 
0.0280 
(0.50) 
-0.1975 
(-0.57) 
-0.6712 
(-2.67)1 
m3 -3.9013 
(-13.30)1 
0.1915 
(0.18) 
-0.7340 
(-4.22) 
-1.9071 
(-2.35)2 
m4 0.0958 
(0.28) 
-1.5979 
(-2.14)2 
0.6691 
(0.88) 
-0.3019 
(-2.09)2 
Constant 0.3481 
(12.18) 
0.4758 
(1.42) 
2.3897 
(5.05) 
1.2283 
(2.68) 
R2 (%) 33.08 28.25 43.07 28.89 
N 38,841 1,394 1,564 3,036 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. a) In all cases, 1992 is the year of reference. 1 denotes significant at 1 percent level; 2 
denotes significant at 5 percent level; 3 denotes significant at 10 percent level. 
 
 
The measure of rent received by public sector workers is obtained by comparing the marginal returns to the 
productivity-related characteristics in all levels of government to those of the private sector. The results of the indexes 
given by expression (5), evaluated at the average values of the private sector workers
 8
 indicate that federal workers at 
any level of education are underpaid compared to „similar‟ private sector workers, while state and local level workers 
receive a positive wage premium that decreases with the level of education, but increases for workers with college or 
more (See Table 3). This would suggest that low skill workers receive relatively higher remunerations in the state and 
local levels of the government compared to „similar‟ private sector workers, while these sectors tend to remunerate 
highly skilled workers less.
9
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Table 3 
Estimated Wage Differentials 
Level of 
Education 
Two-step methodology Without controlling for selection 
Federal State Local Federal State Local 
HS dropout -0.230 0.476 0.219 0.137 0.000 0.009 
High School -0.145 0.427 0.203 0.164 -0.048 -0.010 
College -0.099 0.507 0.176 0.130 -0.046 -0.024 
College + -0.075 0.382 0.261 0.109 -0.010 0.065 
 
 
Although the results support the hypothesis that the public sector tends to reward unskilled workers more 
than those in the private sector, they are in conflict with previous studies suggesting a general positive wage premium 
paid in the public sector, decreasing with the level of government.
10
  
 
The wage differentials presented in the last section are interpreted as the premium (positive or negative) 
public sector workers receive compared to private sector workers. However, for these results to be considered a pure 
measure of the rent paid in the public sector, we should compare the returns that similar individuals working in 
different sectors receive, otherwise such results would also account for the differences in the productivity related 
characteristics themselves. But, how comparable are these workers? According to the results of the test of differences 
in means and proportions shown in Table 1, strong differences exist among individuals across sectors.   
 
As stated before, the fact that we are controlling for the impact of the selection of sector of employment on 
wages does not ensure that all or most of the workers in the sample are similar to each other. The propensity score 
matching methods permit the researcher to select subsamples of individuals from each sector that are similar in terms 
of their PS. Following the general algorithm used to estimate the PSs that satisfy the balancing assumption, we started 
with a parsimonious specification of equation (3) and then tried higher order of the variables and/or interactions if the 
covariates were not balanced.  Variables for which the balancing condition was never satisfied were dropped. As 
Table 4 shows, it was impossible to estimate a logit model where all the proposed covariates were balanced, without 
transforming some of the variables
11
 or dropping others, with the subsequent loss of relevant information.
12
  The state 
level yielded the best results in terms of the number of confounding factors that were controlled for, i.e. all of the 
proposed variables except region. The poorest model corresponds to the local government, so that this sector was 
finally excluded from the analysis.  
 
These results can be seen as a signal of great differences among workers, not only with respect to the private 
sector, but also within the different levels of the public sector. In fact the need for different decision models for each 
level of government suggests that the structure of the decision about sector of employment varies across levels. 
Finally, having such remarkable dissimilarities among groups, such that the estimated PSs do not always control for 
all the relevant factors, is expected to increase the difficulty of finding appropriate matches.  
 
The matching methods consist of taking each treated unit and finding a control unit with a PS close enough to 
consider it as a similar counterpart. The more restrictive the matching conditions, the smaller the differences between 
units and the better the quality of the matches, but at the cost of less efficiency due to the difficulty of finding 
appropriate matches. Among the different matching methods tried, the nearest neighbor (NN) matching method ended 
up showing the highest percentage of average bias reduction, but also with the smallest sample size compared to the 
other matching methods. However, the heterogeneity already observed in this data set and the subsequent difficulties 
in estimating decision models that satisfy the balancing assumption also affected the ability to find appropriate 
matches. After matching the individuals based on the estimated PSs for the federal/private and state/private 
comparisons, we found that almost no worker in the private sector can be considered as a reliable counterpart for 
workers in those two levels of government. In fact, among the 45,686 private sector workers in the sample, only 71 
workers were selected for the federal/private comparison and 154 for the state/private comparison. These results 
support the idea that the workers included in the CPS are so different with respect to each other, that any comparison 
of their returns to human capital investments, as the one obtained in the previous section, may yield misleading results 
if such differences are not accounted for.  
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Table 4 
Logistic Models Used To Estimate PS 
Variables Federal / Private State / Private Local / Private 
Gender 
(Male) 
-- -0.4163 
(-7.75)1 
-- 
Race 
(White) 
0.7755 
(11.57)1 
-0.2962 
(-4.79)1 
-- 
Agectg 
(22-34 years) 
1.2286 
(7.30)1 
0.0518 
(0.57) 
0.9822 
(10.79)1 
Agectg 
(35-49 years) 
1.7697 
(10.67)1 
0.3331 
(3.63)1 
1.5292 
(17.13)1 
Agectg 
(50+ years ) 
1.6428 
(9.53)1 
0.4340 
(4.28)1 
1.6195 
(17.19)1 
Martst 
(Married) 
-- -0.0839 
(-1.59) 
-- 
Eductg 
(College+)(a) 
0.5881 
(7.86)1 
0.8370 
(12.90)1 
0.4542 
(8.82)1 
Vetern 1.2705 
(21.19)1 
0.4113 
(4.85)1 
-0.1359 
(-2.32)2 
Constant -5.2428 
(-32.48) 
-3.1195 
(-33.41) 
-3.7911 
(-44.51) 
N 47,293 47,490 49,381 
LR Chi2 956.29 307.34 692.20 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. a) Eductg recoded as having or not a college degree. 1 denotes significant at 1 percent level; 2 
denotes significant at 5 percent level; 3 denotes significant at 10 percent level. 
 
 
Wage equations as given by equation (4) estimated on the NN matched subsamples would allow the 
comparison of the returns to productivity-related characteristics among truly similar workers. However, we have to 
keep in mind that the results in this way obtained might not be reliable due to the small sample sizes and the relevant 
information missed.  
 
The wage estimates based on OLS applied to the matched subsamples are summarized in Table 5.
 13
 When 
comparing the federal and the private sector (subsample based on PS1) the results indicate that federal workers are 
paid higher returns to experience (AGE) and to high levels of education (some college and more) compared to similar 
private sector workers. The positive effect of race on wages seems to be stronger in the private sector, while the 
impact of gender is higher in the federal sector. Health status, marital status and full-time working condition have a 
stronger impact on wages in the private sector, with the first one showing an unexpected negative sign in the federal 
sector. The cohort effect generally shows a positive impact on wages, but usually stronger in the private sector.  
 
The comparison between the state level and its matched private sector (based on PS2) suggest that both 
sectors pay almost similar returns to experience and to high and low levels of education, but lower returns for workers 
with some college in the private sector.  As expected, the effect of race on wages is higher in the private sector, while 
the gender variable seems to have greater impact in the state level.  As for the other productivity-related variables, 
their positive effect on wages is always higher in the private sector.   
 
Based on these results, wage differentials such as those obtained in the previous section based on expression 
(5) were calculated. The estimated wage differentials shown in Table 6 suggest that both federal and state workers at 
any level of education are underpaid, compared to similar private sector workers. 
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Table 5 
Matching Methods: Regression Results(b) 
 Federal-private comparison 
based on PS1(c) 
Federal-private comparison 
based on PS2(d) 
Variables Federal Private State Private 
Age 0.5737 
(6.96)1 
0.0437 
(2.13)2 
0.0540 
(6.79)1 
0.0655 
(4.29)1 
Age2 -0.0005 
(-5.71)1 
-0.0004 
(-1.44) 
-0.0006 
(-5.30)1 
-0.0007 
(-3.67)1 
Eductg 
(High school) 
0.1432 
(2.89)2 
0.1650 
(0.04) 
0.0691 
(1.53) 
0.0688 
(0.44) 
Eductg 
(Some college) 
0.2014 
(4.56)1 
0.1840 
(0.33) 
0.1622 
(4.58)1 
0.0965 
(0.92) 
Eductg 
(College +) 
03625 
(8.04)1 
0.3184 
(1.48) 
0.3806 
(9.24)1 
0.3837 
(3.00)1 
Race 
(White) 
0.0817 
(2.86)2 
0.0942 
(0.22) 
0.0087 
(0.29) 
0.0905 
(1.14) 
Gender 
(Male) 
0.1586 
(6.74)1 
0.0098 
(0.64) 
0.1548 
(5.00)1 
0.0920 
(0.63) 
Health 
(Good health) 
-0.0205 
(-0.77) 
0.3373 
(1.08) 
0.0459 
(0.14) 
0.1001 
(1.00) 
Martst 
(Married) 
0.0170 
(0.26) 
0.1178 
(0.41) 
0.0940 
(4.56)1 
0.2401 
(2.57)2 
Fultme 0.2471 
(5.42)1 
0.4602 
(2.38)2 
0.2798 
(8.73)1 
0.3738 
(2.25)2 
T (1994)(a) 0.0037 
(0.18) 
-0.0149 
(-0.55) 
0.0659 
(2.40)2 
0.1220 
(0.58) 
T (1996) 0.0521 
(0.17) 
0.2354 
(1.44) 
0.1559 
(4.55)1 
0.0805 
(0.17) 
T (1998) 0.0417 
(0.46) 
0.0644 
(0.12) 
0.1437 
(5.01)1 
0.1311 
(0.37) 
T (2000) 0.1352 
(2.88)2 
0.4410 
(2.02)2 
0.1772 
(6.72)1 
0.1362 
(0.94) 
Constant 0.6713 
(3.35) 
0.0050 
(0.10) 
0.4595 
(4.45) 
0.071 
(0.13) 
R2 (%) 33.70 96.87 45.67 96.22 
N 855 54 1,014 124 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. a) In all cases, 1992 is the year of reference. b) Comparison with respect the local 
government not included. c) PS1 refers to PS estimated based on the federal/private comparison. d) PS2 refers to the PS 
estimated based on the state/private comparison. 1 denotes significant at 1per cent; 2 denotes significant at 5 percent; 3 denotes 
significant at 10 percent. 
 
 
Table 6 
Estimated Wage Differentials: 
NN Propensity Score Matching Method 
Level Of Education Federal State 
HS dropout -0.695 -0.494 
High School -0.716 -0.494 
Some College -0.677 -0.428 
College + -0.650 -0.497 
 
 
Two things are worth noting at this point. It is true that this last comparison is based on individuals from 
different sectors that are comparable, at least in terms of their PS. However, it is also true that this PS lacks relevant 
information as the result of estimation problems due to the high level of heterogeneity of the sample. This problem, 
together with the small sample size finally obtained may lead one to conclude that the results of the propensity score 
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matching method are not reliable, or even more that such a method is not applicable to the wage comparison across 
sectors. Whatever conclusion is reached, it is still true that the individuals in this CPS sample are too heterogeneous 
both between sectors and within sectors to allow any comparison based on similar workers. Therefore, any wage 
differential calculated based on such a sample is not a reliable measure of how much more or less a public sector 
workers are paid compared to similar private sector workers, unless the differences among workers are accounted for. 
 
The poor results obtained in the PS matching method were expected. We knew since the beginning that a 
fundamental condition for this method to work is to have a significant proportion of comparable units in all groups. 
Otherwise it would be difficult to find appropriate matches, substantially reducing the efficiency of estimates. 
However when the whole analysis is based on the premise that units are as similar as possible, traditional selection 
bias correction models also may be not enough, since they do not control for this required homogeneity. 
Unfortunately, the CPS data set seems to be unsuitable for use in comparing wages among similar workers, due to the 
strong dissimilarities observed among workers in this data set.   
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
This study approaches the public/ private wage comparison issue by comparing the results obtained from the 
application of two different methodologies that focus on correcting the selection bias problems that result from the 
nonrandom allocation of workers across sectors. We show that accounting for the endogeneity of the sector of 
employment does not ensure that the groups are comparable. If in addition the analysis assumes that the workers from 
different sectors are similar to each other,  we also need to find reliable counterparts.  
 
When controlling for the factors affecting the individual‟s decision about sector of employment, the results 
suggest that state and local workers are paid a positive wage premium compared to private sector workers. This 
premium generally decreases with the level of education. Federal workers, on the other hand, tend to be under 
compensated at all levels of education. However, a look at the main statistics of the variables indicated that the data 
set includes individuals that show little similarities among them, dissimilarities that are not accounted for by simply 
modeling the effect of the sector of employment decision on the wage comparison.  
 
In applying the propensity score matching method, we found that deep differences exist among workers both 
between and within sectors, and that only a small and not significant proportion of them were similar in terms of their 
probability of working in the public sector. In fact, the problems faced when applying this method reinforced the 
initial conclusion that the CPS data set was too heterogeneous to be used to compare wages across sectors. Such 
heterogeneity affected the possibilities of finding appropriate matches, so that the results from this method on this data 
set lack efficiency.  
 
These suggest that in spite of its wide use in comparing wages among sectors, the CPS March supplement -at 
least for the period considered, shows such a high level of heterogeneity that it makes it difficult to find appropriate 
matches. This finding illustrates the non-appropriateness of this data to measure rent under the premise that similar 
workers should be paid similar wages, unless some restrictions are introduced in order to make the sample more 
homogenous.  An appropriate transformation of the sample would be to divide it into groups by age, limiting the 
analysis to a specific group or set of groups. One would expect more homogeneity within older age groups, compared 
to younger ones since the former tend to include workers that already have completed their education and have 
stabilized their position in the labor force.  However, the price of this higher level of homogeneity again will be less 
efficiency.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. Actually, the final sample includes the CPS data for years 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. 
2. Notice that the PS can be used as a control function when inserted in the right hand side of the wage equation 
to control for the probability of choosing a specific sector of employment. However, this still would not 
ensure that the workers are comparable. 
3. Notice that testing the mean of each characteristic is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the balancing 
assumption to hold, since higher order moments of the distribution of these variables may differ across 
sectors. However, the state of the art of the software programs available allows just a weak test of the 
balancing condition of the pre-treatment variables limited to the comparison of the first moment of the 
covariates. 
4. Imbens (2000) proposed an extension to the methodology suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin that allows for 
estimation of average causal effects with multi-valued treatments. However, software programs for this so 
called Generalized Propensity Score Method (GPSM) are not available yet. The GPSM follows three steps: 
first, multinomial discrete response models are estimated for the set of distinct treatments; second, the 
conditional expectation of the outcome given the level of the treatment and the probability of receiving the 
treatment is calculated. Finally, the average response at treatment level is estimated. 
5. The model does not control for union status, as traditional wage models do, since unions may help to provide 
rent for workers. Models controlling for union status may underestimate the true magnitude of the rent  
(Ramoni 2004). 
6. Other matching methods were tried, but the NN is the one for which the matched subsamples showed the 
highest percentage of bias reduction. 
7. For the propensity score matching method the index should be evaluated based on the average characteristics 
of the matched private sector workers. 
8. For the binomial variables a value of one was always assumed; the comparison is done at year 2000. 
9. Notice that without controlling for the selection of sector of employment, the results are totally the opposite, 
suggesting that a rent is consistently paid only in the federal level, while workers in the state and local levels 
are generally underpaid. 
10. Smith (1974a) found a wage premium that ranges from 29 percent for workers at the federal level, to 5.5 
percent at the state level, but is usually negative (for men) at the local level. Bellante and Long (1981) found 
a positive wage premium of about 20 percent at the federal level, going down to 2 percent at the state level, 
and becoming negative for workers at the local level. Gyourko and Tracy‟s estimates range between 18.9 and 
1.2 percent. 
11. EDUCTG was recoded as having or not having a college degree. AGE was divided into 4 categories. 
12. Heckman and Navarro (2004) define what is the minimal relevant information required to properly estimate 
the PS. 
13. Heteroscedasticity problems are more likely to be present when working with individual data. To solve it, 
robust equations were estimated using the Huber-White estimator of variance. In general equations supported 
the assumptions of non multicollinearity and correct specification, except for the private sector based on PS1. 
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